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use of the automobile by such member of the household,
and cannot be established merely by facts and circum-
stances which would lead a reasonable person to believe
that actual consent had been given.
25
3. If a trial judge recognizes the necessity of further
consideration by a jury of its verdict or answers to in-
terrogatories and re-submits the case for further jury
deliberation, this should be done by the judge without
comment or emphasis on any single phase or instruction
in the case.
26
The last three cases, Yockey Trucking v. Handy, 7 Book v.
Paddock,28 and Siefried v. Mosher,29 had similar fact situations, in
that each involved a collision of automobiles on our state highways.
The decisions were not reached by application of tort law, but simply
affirmed jury verdicts for the plaintiffs, on the premises that all in-
ferences fairly deducible from the evidence are drawn in favor
of the verdict by an appellate court and in favor of the other party
by a trial court when it is asked to direct a verdict. The Yockey
Trucking case further stated that this rule of law is equally appli-
cable to those situations where the facts are undisputed, if fair
minded persons may form different opinions and draw different
conclusions from the facts.
DAMAGES, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AND LABOR LAW
WINSTON W. WOLVINGTON. of the Denver Bar
DAMAGES
In the past year, four cases involving the general question of
damages have been decided by our Supreme Court. Two of the
cases deal with the question of the substantive right to damages
and two cases deal with the question of the proper measure of
damages.
In the case of Weng v. Schleiger,' several interesting questions
of damages were determined. Mr. and Mrs. Schleiger owned an
automobile jointly. They and their minor son, John, were in the
automobile when it was struck by the defendant's truck, causing
injuries to all three and damages to the car. All three brought an
action against defendant which contained causes of action -as fol-
lows: (1) a cause of action by Mr. and Mrs. Schleiger for the dam-
age to the automobile; (2) a cause of action by Mrs. Schleiger for
the loss of support and companionship of her husband; (3) a cause
See Footnote 23, supra.
See Footnote 22, supra.
262 P. 2d 930, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 4, p. 72.
267 P. 2d 247, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 9, p. 196.
268 P. 2d 411, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 10, p. 218.
'273 P. 2d 356, 1953-54 C. B. A, Adv. Sh. No. 17.
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of action for the injuries to Mrs. Schleiger; and (4) a cause of ac-
tion for injuries to the son John. This complaint was dismissed
under the District Court Rule for want of prosecution. Mrs.
Schleiger and son John moved for reinstatement of the case, which
motion was granted. Mr. Schleiger did not move to reinstate his
case. The case was tried to a jury which returned verdicts in favor
of Mrs. Schleiger in the sum of $8000 and in favor of son John in
the sum of $10,000. As to the first cause of action (property dam-
age), the Court held, first, that the husband, being a joint owner
of the automobile, was an indispensable party, and since he was
dismissed from the case under the rule, the trial court had no juris-
diction to hear the question of damages to the automobile. For
good measure, the Court also stated that the plaintiff had failed to
prove the value of the car before and after the accident and for
that reason also was not entitled to recovery on the first cause of
action. As to the second cause of action (loss of support and com-
panionship of husband), the Court held that the defendant's mo-
tion to strike that casue of action should have been sustained and
that it was error to submit the question of damages to the wife for
loss of support and companionship of her husband to the jury,
even though by special interrogatory, the jury had said it granted
no damages on that cause of action. As to the third and fourth
causes of action (personal injuries to wife and son), the Court held
that if the major portion of the verdicts was based on these causes
of action, then the verdicts were not supported by the evidence,
there being no evidence of any permanent injury.
In Kling v. Phayer,2 the Court held that in an automobile ac-
cident case in which one driver was killed but left no "heirs" sur-
viving as the term "heir" is used in the wrongful death statute,
his administrator may bring an action against the other driver for
the amount of the funeral expenses.
In MeEntyre v. Jones,3 the question before the Court was
whether the damages in an action for the wrongful death of a
thirteen-year-old girl were excessive. The Court held damages in
such a case are to be measured, not for the period of the child's
minority, but for the period of the child's life expectancy, but con-
fined to the expectancy of the parent or parents involved. In other
words, the Court said that parents are entitled to damages for loss
of services of a child during minority and for loss of support and
maintenance from him during the declining years of life. The
Court also held that funeral expenses are a proper element of dam-
age in a wrongful death action even though not specially pleaded.
The final case under this heading is Ark-Valley Alfalfa Mills
v. Day,4 wherein the Court held that the damages awarded to the
plaintiffs were excessive. James E. Day, who had bruises on his
2 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 18.
3 263 P. 2d 313, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
4 263 P. 2d 815, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
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chest and left knee, nervousness and a bump on his head, was
awarded $1517 actual damages and $1000 exemplary damages. Inez
Day, who suffered a cut on her head, had black and blue knees, and
claimed she was upset and suffered nervous headaches, was awarded
$1200 actual and $1000 exemplary damages. Eileen Day, who had
a cut on her head and claimed nervousness, was awarded $600 ac-
tual and $500 exemplary damages. There was no evidence of any
permanent disability to any of the plaintiffs. The Court restated
the well-established rule that if exemplary damages are awarded,
they must bear some relation to the compensatory damages.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Eleven cases have been determined by our Supreme Court in
the past year involving situations arising under Chapter 97 Colo-
rado Statutes Annotated. Eight of the cases fall under what is
commonly known as the Workmen's Compensation Act. Two fall
under the heading of unemployment compensation. One falls under
the Occupational Disease Act. The cases will be considered in that
order.
The cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act will be con-
sidered in the order in which the sections of the statute that they
deal with appear.
In Industrial Commission v. Pacific Employers Insurance Com-
pany,5 and Montgomery Ward, Inc. v. Industrial Commission,6 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the well established principle that find-
ings of fact by the Industrial Commission which are supported by
competent evidence will not be disturbed by the courts on review.
The former case involved a claimant who had hemorrhoids which
did not bother him; in fact, he didn't know he had them. While at
work, he pulled on a wrench, felt a pain in his groin, and on emerg-
ing from his working place, noticed for the first time that he had
hemorrhoids which caused him some discomfort and pain. A doc-
tor's report introduced in evidence stated flatly that the strain did
not cause the hemorrhoids but that it was probably responsible
for the symptoms as described. The Commission found that the
claimant's hemorrhoids were aggravated by the strain. The Court
held that the claimant's testimony and the medical report consti-
tuted some evidence of aggravation of a pre-existing condition and
the award was affirmed. The latter case involved a claimant who
fell from ladder and struck her head. She did not appear to have
any injury of consequence but shortly thereafter she suffered
severe headaches and nausea, and lost her sense of balance. The
question involved was whether she had been injured in the accident
or had had a stroke not connected with the accident. The Court re-
viewed the evidence given by the doctors, both oral testimony and
written reports, some of which had not been formally introduced
in evidence before the Commission and determined that the compe-
* 262 P. 2d 926, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 4.
* 263 P. 2d 817, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
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tent evidence, together with reasonable inferences which could be
made therefrom, were sufficient to support the award.
In School District v. Schmidt,7 the claimant was employed as
a janitor by the School District. The School District made a deal
with a local church under which the church sent some of its mem-
bers to the school to do the janitor's work while the janitor stuccoed
the church. He fell from a scaffolding and claimed compensation
under Section 11 of the act which provides compensation for an
employee loaned by employer "who has accepted the provisions of
this act." The argument was that since the School District is re-
quired to accept, it was not covered under Section 11. The Court
held the case compensable, stating that it could see no intent to
distingush between a private employer and a school district.
Section 49 of the Workmen's Compensation Act was considered
by the Supreme Court in Flake Motors v. Industrial Commission,'
Flake Motors was a partnership in the used car business in Den-
ver. The firm entered into a contract with one Carter to erect a
sign on its used car lot. The claimant was an employee of Carter
and was injured while working on the sign. He filed a claim against
both-Carter and Flake Motors for compensation, claiming that
Flake Motors was contracting out part of its business when it en-
gaged Carter to build and maintain the sign. Claimant was hired,
supervised, paid, and furnished with tools by Carter. The Commis-
sion and the District Court held that Flake Motors was jointly
liable with Carter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Flake
Motors was in the business of buying and selling automobiles, not
in the sign business.
An interesting decision under Section 52 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act is U. S. National Bank v. Industrial Commis-
sionY Mr. and Mrs. Conway, parents of two minor children, were
both employed by the same employer, and while engaged in such
employment, were simultaneously killed in an airplane crash. The
bank as guardian of the children filed claims before the Indus-
trial Commission in both the father's case and the mother's case.
On the strength of the case of London Guarantee and Accident Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 78 Colo. 478, the Commission granted
compensation to the children in the father's case, but denied it in
the mother's case, holding that the children were totally dependent
upon the father. The District Court affirmed, but the Supreme
Court reversed and granted full compensation in both cases. The
Court held tha under Section 52, children of the deceased are con-
clusively presumed to be totally dependent. It is wholly a question
of law under the statute. The Commission erred in determining
as a matter of fact that the children were wholly dependent on the
father. If they are children of the deceased, whether the deceased
1263 P. 2d 581, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
8 262 P. 2d 736, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 4.
9262 P. 2d 731, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 4.
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be their father or mother or both, they are conclusively presumed
to be dependents and entitled to compensation.
The case of Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commis-
sion,10 involves the provisions of Section 81 of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. In that case, the claimant was injured at work and
was put under the care of company physicians. After being treated
by these physicians for some time, he became dissatisfied with their
services and without permission of the employer went to his own
doctor who performed an operation to relieve his condition. The
employer took the position that since the claimant changed doc-
tors without the approval of the employer or of the Commission,
he was not entitled to any benefits, either compensation or medical,
from the time the change was made. The Commission granted full
compensation and medical benefits and the District Court affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that under Section 81 the employer did not
have to pay for any medical or hospital expenses incurred by the
claimant without its consent, but that it was liable to pay compen-
sation for temporary total disability and permanent partial dis-
ability resulting from the accident.
Section 84, dealing with the statute of limitations, was consid-
ered by the Supreme Court in Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. In-
dutrial Commission." In that case the claimant died as a result of
a burn on his foot which in turn caused a pulmonary embolus, or
at least that was the finding of the Commission on conflicting evi-
dence which the Court would not disturb on review under the well
established rule discussed above. The widow, on behalf of herself
and two minor children, did not file claim for compensation until
more than one year after the accident. After the accident, the
widow went to the employer to collect some group insurance bene-
fits. At that time she asked if the Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. did
not have "state insurance" and the reply was, "No, this is all the
insurance we carry. We're self-insured." The Court held that this
reply was misleading and that that fact, coupled with the fact that
the widow did not know that the death had been caused by accident,
was sufficient evidence of a "reasonable excuse" to prevent the run-
ning of the statute. The Court also held that the burden of prov-
ing that the employer has been prejudiced by failure to file a claim
is on the employer.
Finally, in the cases of Sterns-Roger Manufacturing Co. v.
Casteel 12 and Devore v. Industrial Commission,13 the court consid-
ered procedural questions under Section 97. In the Sterns-Roger's
case the claimant and a fellow worker were on their way from
Denver to Grand Junction to work for the employer. On the way
they bought a bottle of whiskey and apparently imbibed generously
therefrom. When the friend was driving and the claimant was
10 269 P. 2d 1070, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 13.
"269 P. 2d 696, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
"261 P. 2d 288, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 1.
1 266 P. 2d 774, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 8.
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asleep in the back seat, an accident occurred injuring claimant.
The insurance carrier contested the case on two grounds: First,
that the accident did not arise out of the employment and, second,
that if it did, that the 50 per cent penalty provided for in Section
83(c) where the injury results from intoxication, be invoked. The
referee ruled against the carrier on both of these points and granted
full compensation. The carrier, within 15 days, filed a petition to
review, raising both points. The Commission then reviewed the
file and affirmed the award of the referee but invoked the 50 per
cent penalty. The carrier did not petition to review this award but
the claimant filed a petition to review the Commission's award in
sofar as it invoked the penalty. On this petition, the Commission
reversed itself and found the case compensable and did not invoke
the penalty. The carrier then filed a petition to review, raising both
the questions of compensability and of the penalty. By this time,
the Commission had made up its mind and it affirmed its award of
full compensation. The carrier appealed, raising both the question
of whether the accident arose out of the employment and the ques-
tion of penalty. The Supreme Court held that the first question
was not before it. When the Commission found the case to be com-
pensable but invoked the penalty, no petition to review the deter-
mination of compensability was filed within 15 days and that issue
became final even though the claimant did petition to review on the
penalty determination. On the question of penalty, the court held
that since the claimant was asleep in the car when the accident hap-
pened, his injury did not result from his intoxication and the Com-
mission was correct when it finally decided not to invoke the pen-
alty.
In the Devore case the claimant admittedly failed to file a peti-
tion to review an award within the 15 day period prescribed by
statute but contended that she was excused from doing so because
the award was not sent to the correct address. She contended that
at the time of the award, she was in General Rose Hospital in
Denver, and that the Commission knew this because a hearing had
been held at her bedside. The award was sent to her Fort Collins
home where all former papers in the matter were sent. The Court
held that the notice had been properly sent in accordance with Sec-
tion 97, and that the courts had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The two unemployment compensation cases both involve situ-
ations arising under Section 5 and 6 of the Colorado Unemployment
Security Act, dealing with disqualification of a claimant for volun-
tarily leaving work or refusing suitable employment. In the first,
Industrial Commission v. Brady,14 the claimant was a journeyman
painter and a member of the painters' union. He was out of work
and drawing compensation, when the department of unemployment
security located a job for him with one Davis. This was a non-
union job and paid $2.00 per hour. The union rate was $2.35 per
hour. He refused the job and was accordingly disqualified for un-
14 263 P. 2d 578, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
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employment compensation. At a hearing before a referee, it was
found that the prevailing wage was $2.39 per hour with time and
a half for overtime. The referee held that the offered work was at
a wage substantially less favorable than that prevailing for similar
work in the locality and ruled the claimant was not disqualified.
The Commission reversed the referee. Thie District Court reversed
the Commission. The Supreme Court held the claimant was not
disqualified. The Court said all of the evidence proved that the
prevailing wage rate was $2.39 per hour, and that the offer to the
claimant was substantially less favorable than the prevailing wage
rate.
In the second case, Industrial Commission v. Wilbanks," the
claimant, a union carpenter, quit a job at Estes Park which paid
$2.00 per hour but no overtime. There was testimony concerning
the prevailing wage rate in a number of different localities, includ-
ing Estes Park, and there was conflict in the evidence as to what
the rate was. The Court held that Estes Park was a distinct local-
ity and there being conflict in the evidence as to the prevailing
wage rate in that locality; the Court would not disturb the findings
of fact of the Commission which had found the claimant was dis-
qualified.
In Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Alitto, 6 our court had oc-
casion to construe the provisions of the Occupational Disease Act
which deal with silicosis. The claimant went to work in 1908 as
a bricklayer. It was undisputed that in this work he was exposed
to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide. He continued in this work
until 1945 when he became a master brick mason. There was evi-
dence that from that date until his death in 1952, he was still ex-
posed to silicon dioxide dust on numerous occasions in his super-
visory job. The employer took the position that there was not any
evidence of an injurious exposure to silicon dioxide dust for at least
sixty days after the effective date of the act. The Court held there
was such exposure. The Court held further that it was not neces-
sary that the claimant have been exposed sixty days after the ef-
fective date of the act. The Court again repeated its previous hold-
ing that the Occupational Disease Act is to be liberally construed
to effect its purpose.
LABOR LAW
Under this heading there have been two decisions in the past
here: one involving a labor dispute in the usual sense of the word,
and one a policeman's pension case.
In United Mine Workers v. Sunlight Coal Co.17 the court was
called upon to construe the language of the Labor Peace Act which
provides that the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction over em-
ployers who regularly engage the services of eight or more em-
" 271 P. 2d -, 1953-54 C. B. D. Adv. Sh. No. 17.
- 273 P. 2d 725, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 18.
IT 270 P. 2d 776, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
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ployees. The evidence in the case indicated that the employer in-
volved, during the months of December, 1952, and January, 1953,
had 14 employees working in the mine. In a report to the govern-
ment, the employer had reported his yearly average of employees
was 6.7. The State Coal Mine Inspection Report for the year 1952
showed that the company had an average of 9.4 men working dur-
ing that year.
The Court held that to determine whether employees are "reg-
ularly engaged", the test is to determine whether the employment
was casual or whether these were regular employees engaged in the
business. It was held that the employees involved were regular
employees and not casual laborers and that therefore the Industrial
Commission had jurisdiction to hear the dispute.
In the case of Pension Fund Trustees v. Starasinich,18 the
plaintiff was a police officer on the Pueblo Police Department for
23 years up to July 30, 1949, when he was discharged for miscon-
duct. After his discharge, he applied for a pension, claiming that
he had incurred physical disabilities while he was a police officer
in good standing. The question to be determined was whether after
discharge an officer could apply for and receive a pension. The ar-
gument of the trustees was that under the statutes and ordinances
applicable, an officer must be in good standing at the time of the
application to be entitled to a pension. The Court held that in order
to be entitled to a pension, an officer must be in good standing at
the time of death or injury and that the fact that he has been dis-
charged since his injury will not bar him from a pension if he was
in good standing at the time of the injury.
From its title, the case of Shore v. Denver Bldg. & Construc-
tion Trades Council,19 would appear to be a case involving labor
law. An examination of the case will reveal that basically it is a
labor case but although the case has been twice tried in the District
Court and twice-appealed to the Supreme Court no question of labor
law has yet been raised in a form calling for a decision by the
Supreme Court. There will be a third trial in the District Court
and probably a third appeal, and perhaps some later reviewer will
have occasion to review the labor questions involved.
FAMILY LAW, PROBATE LAW, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SAM FRAZIN, of the Denver Bar
FAMILY LAW
I. Lawson v. Lawson, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 1.
Facts: Plaintiff, the wife, was a resident of Denver through-
out her entire life. She went to Fortville, Indiana, for the sole pur-
pose of marrying the defendant who was then stationed there in
264 P. 2d 1033, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 7.
263 P. 2d 315, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
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